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• The Thailand Baht under speculative attack
July Early • The Thailand Baht exchange rate regime was
switched to floating one and the Thailand
Central Bank applied to the IMF for technical
assistance
• The Malaysian Central Bank intervened in
foreign exchange markets
mid • The Philippines and Indonesia extended their
floating bands of exchange rate
Late • The Malaysian foreign exchange markets
collapsed
August Early • Thailand announced a stabilisation program
for financial sector as recommended by the
IMF
Mid • Indonesia switched to flexible exchange rate
regime
• The IMF accepted a financial aid package of
17.2 billion US dollar to Thailand
October Late • The situation of the companies that had been
facing payment difficulties resulted in
speculative attack on Won in Korea
• The IMF announced a financial aid package of
40 billion US dollars to Indonesia
November Early • 16 banks in Indonesia were liquidated
• Latin American stock markets crashed
Mid • Nikkei, Dow Jones, Dax Extra ended in day
lows
• The floating band of Won was extended to 10
percent
Late • Yamaichi of Japan went bankrupt
December Early • Russia raised interest rates
• The IMF rescue package of 57 billion US
dollars to Korea was accepted. Korea
accepted a fiscal surplus by spending cuts4
and tax hikes as well as lowering growth level
in 1998 to 3 percent from 6 percent.
• The IMF revised its world growth by
downgrading.
• Social stress in Indonesia
Late • World's major banks agreed on rescheduling
short-term debt of  Korea amounting 100
billion US dollars.
1998 Jan • Letter of intent was signed by the IMF and
Indonesia that requires government to bail-out
highly indebted banks and limits the fiscal
contraction
• Asian currencies headed south against US
dollar
• Rescheduling of Asian nations short-term debt
by international creditors. Korea's
rescheduling amounts to 24 billion US dollars.
February • The Gulf Crisis
End-Mar • The US senate as well as industrial nations
agreed on a more transparent and
accountable IMF
End-May • Russian Economic Stress due to liquidity
squeeze and rush to foreign exchange
July • Fed intervened in the Japanese yen market
with 5 billion US dollars purchase of yen
August • Latin American Stock Markets crashed due to
loss of confidence in emerging markets
• Russian Economic Crisis, "Moratorium for 90
days on foreign debt"
October • Fed and BOJ lowered  interest rates and 4
billion US dollars of bail-out package for LTCM
was announced.
• The IMF-World Bank Annual Meeting
• "G7 countries decided on financial aid
package to the crisis countries, especially to
Latin America"
• Japanese bank restructuring package of 1
trillion US dollars was announced
Source:Reuters5
1. Introduction
Technological advances in the near past made the international
financial community to be highly sophisticated as well as efficient.
The efficiency in flow of funds provided further growth in the
participant nations. However, as the system evolves in itself,
problems that arise in one part of the world  or a misjudgment in
international investment have immediate and chain responses in the
global community.
Thailand was the initial point that faced the problems of lacking
perfect infrastructure and operational efficiency in a system of
rejecting fundamentals in valuation. In a few weeks, Thailand
transmitted her problems to neighbouring countries and then to
Russia, Latin America and most of the emerging economies including
Turkey.
Financial distress towards a currency and financial crisis
became the main determinant of the conjuncture in 1998 that began
in the early 1997 as a snowball and continued to be an avalanche in
1998. As a result of the default in the emerging financial community,
almost all of the emerging markets began to be considered as risky
that rises from increasing uncertainty about the near future of the
financial markets.
On the other hand, the fall in the prices of primary goods had a
negative effect on the current account balances of the countries
depending on the exports of such commodities such as Russia and
Venezuela. In this respect, international investors became more
cautious in their investment in the emerging markets and became
even more reluctant to provide credit to these markets.6
As a result, international investors forwarded their funds to the
"developed markets" where they consider them as safe heavens.
Eventually, a high demand of bonds in these economies began to
push the yields down which resulted in gains in the bond markets.
The rise of the spreads in the emerging markets and lack of foreign
borrowing resulted in a necessity to finance the debt through
domestic borrowing that increased the pressure for further
depreciation of the domestic currencies. However, one consequence
of the financial crisis is the decline in the growth rate of world output
where the IMF revised its figures down by 1 percent to 2 percent in
September 1998.
Consequently, new policy debate and new measures are being
taken under consideration since the tools at hand once again failed
as in the case of the early 1995 Mexican crisis. The G7 countries get
together for further adjustment in the capital flows, such as diverting
funds to the crisis countries to have a relief in the short term to halt
the capital outflow, and supporting the discussions on the issues of
strengthening international financial system through closed banking
supervision, inspection, increasing transparency, accountability, and
credibility (World Bank Group, 1998).
The second, third and fourth  sections of the paper examine the
fundamental causes, first responses and the initial effects of the
crisis. In the fifth and sixth sections, the effects of the crisis on G7
countries and Turkey are examined. The following section discusses
the aftermath of the problem. Section eight provides expectations in
the Turkish economy for 1999. The last two parts of the study raise
some questions on further adjustments in the world and give
concluding remarks.7
2. Fundamental Causes of the Crisis
The myth of the Asian miracle in the last two decades was
constructed on the formation of large corporations to drive the
economic growth. In this respect, these companies were given the
privilege to grow faster through forming a financial sector within the
industry so that they would be able to create their own funds
domestically and abroad.
With massive capital account liberalisations in the 1990's,
capital flows drastically increased to the emerging economies
especially to Southeast Asian  economies. Because financial sector
was able to provide necessary funds to real sector, equilibrium rate of
interest was also determined within the system and as the inflow of
capital was managed by private sector, governments did not have
significant controls on short-term foreign borrowing and central banks
of the countries in the region had no significant dominance on interest
rates.
However, some parts of the short-term borrowings were used to
invest in mostly fixed assets for future collateral to future borrowing.
In this respect, the total debt/equity ratio of the companies reached
almost ranging from 200 to 8000 percent in the region which brought
vulnerability to the system (Corsetti et al., 1998).
Moreover, long-term credit was disbursed to sectors of non-
foreign currency earnings such as construction and real estate
through external short-term borrowing of banks. The maturity and
currency mismatch resulted in higher indebtedness that eventually
ended in higher risks in the financial sector.   
Another consequence of the evolve of the crisis was that high
capital inflows in the 1990's caused home currencies to be8
appreciated against currencies other than the US dollar (Özbay,
Salman, Þahinbeyoðlu, 1998). In addition, due to the strengthening of
the US economy, the US dollar appreciated against major currencies
and the countries having fixed their currencies to the US dollar
appreciated as well which might promulgate the expected current
account worsening at hand. This is due to the fact that exports of
these countries are forwarded to Japan and Europe.
In addition, duality in the financial system was the first
inefficiency rising in the Asian economies. The integration of the
financial system with the real sector which is already oligopolistic in
itself creates a significant problem. There was no access to other
players in the sector because a parallel financial sector had a
different structure than other economies’ where monetary policy had
lesser effect on the financial sector as compared to other economies.
The second inefficiency is the  heavy use of derivatives to hedge in
the money markets. Forward contracts were used to hedge at the
margins to buy foreign currency like the Japanese yen and the US
dollar which created positive illusions in the market. Nonetheless,
when there was a pass through the margins, investors chose to shift
to real balances which resulted with an acceleration in the rush for
foreign exchange and eventually collapse of the system occurred.
Moreover, high intra-regional integration and flexibility in
selection of the production base supported with ample capacity
caused chain depreciations.
The default of the Southeast Asian countries put stress on other
emerging markets. This was particularly because international
investment banks consider emerging markets more or less the same
which we call the simplistic categorisation. For this particular
reason, investment banks became more cautious with the whole9
emerging market area. A minor shift in economic indicators was
immediately reflected in capital outflow and decreased lending.
Further spillover effects of the crisis on Latin America were felt
through weakening of the current account balances. Venezuela can
be taken as an example since most of her exports depend on oil and
oil products; a fall in oil prices (Graph I) was immediately reflected on
current account balance and in a fragile environment of crisis any
deviation from the stability in the macro aggregates resulted in a
speculative attack on the currency with increasing demand for capital
outflow. On the other hand, even if Russia faced the same situation
as Venezuela, however, the important factor that pushed Russia into
a crisis was the financing of the Russian Treasury's expenses
through printing money by the Central Bank (Salman, 1998).
3. First Attempts of the Countries to Overcome the Crisis
In order to be in line with the goal of economic stability,
countries initially defended the fixed exchange rate regime; however,
when they could not able to cope with the situation, they extended
exchange rate bands and/or abolished floating exchange rate
regimes (Graph II). Afterwards, interest rates rose initially overnight
interest rates; however, since government had little control in the
interest rates due to high private sector own financing, the rise in the
interest rates was not enough to prevent a rush to foreign exchange
purchases and capital outflow. In this respect, the government had
only the fiscal policy at hand.  Even though the rise in the interest
rates was not sufficient, the government chose to let the depreciation
of the currency as an effective policy option.
Speculative attacks and loss in credibility finally resulted in
capital outflows and high losses in the international reserves of the
countries which again penetrated a further loss of funds and10
credibility in the government institutions. In order to restore the
confidence in the markets and halt the capital outflow, the IMF was
invited by the countries for technical assistance. With technical
assistance, the spillover effects of the crisis on other countries were
given effort to prevent the crisis before it became a global one.
The IMF advised the countries for a depreciation of their
currencies to restore competitiveness and halt capital outflow and go
for further fiscal contraction. However, most of the Southeast Asian
countries as a common feature had fiscal surpluses (Corsetti et al.,
1998). That was one of the indicators that prevented inflation and
continuing high growth at the same time in the past. Further fiscal
contraction was aimed at a contraction in demand which would
contract imports and through future current account surpluses,
external obligations of the countries would be met.
4. Initial Effects of the Crisis
Since large losses were expected in the financial markets of the
crisis countries, the demand for capital outflow was observed. The
extent of the capital inflow in the emerging economies was 190 billion
US dollars in 1996; however, with a declining trend in 1997, it is
expected to decrease to 65 billion US dollars in 1998 (IMF, 1998)
(Graph III).
International reserves fell due to excessive intervention in the
foreign exchange market to defend the floating exchange rate policy
within the given bands (Table I). This was particularly the first thing
that happened due to excessive foreign exchange demand and it has
been observed in all the emerging economies since the second half
of 1997. Even it presented a  declining trend in the first half of 1998, it
again gained pace with the Russian crisis. The announcement of11
policies such as moratorium on debts for 90 days and extending the
exchange rate bands which was taken as an implicit depreciation in
Russia accelerated the capital outflow from all emerging markets.
On the other hand, interest rates went up due to excess liquidity
demand (higher yield spreads). This is easily seen through the
decline in the yield for external-currency-denominated debt
instruments of the emerging markets. According to the bond price
index calculated by JP Morgan  covering Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador,
Mexico, Panama, Peru, Venezuela, Bulgaria, Morocco, Nigeria, the
Philippines, Poland and Russia where Brady bonds, loans,
Eurobonds and US dollar denominated local market instruments were
included, sharp falls in the prices (sharp increases in their yields)
were seen in the October 1997 and August 1998 period (Graph IV).
One major implication of sharp currency depreciations was the
drastic increase in the debt  stock and debt service ratios. If the
debt stock is examined on a country base, in Indonesia external debt
stock is expected to increase from 50 percent of GDP in 1997 to 167
percent of GDP in 1998, in the Philippines from 50 percent levels to
70 percent levels, in Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand from 40
percent levels to 60 percent levels. This would also be reflected as a
deterioration of the wealth of the individuals in these economies
(Deutsche Bank Research, 1998).
As well as a loss of confidence in the financial markets of
the emerging economies and collapse of the stock markets, the
bankruptcies of major institutions in the emerging economies resulted
in heavy declines in the stock market indices. International and
domestic investors began to realise their profits in the emerging
markets which resulted in major capital market losses and loss of
fund raising ability of the corporations whose stocks were traded in12
the stock markets. The losses were seen in both the emerging
markets and the developed markets (Table II). This had two
implications; the first one was the uncertainty created in the markets
resulted in a loss of confidence in the whole emerging market area.
The second one was in order to overcome the losses in the stock
markets, profits were realised in other emerging economies (money
markets, stock markets, etc.) which led to all fall in the stock markets
in the world (Graph V).
Due to competitive devaluations in the region, goods purchased
from these countries became cheaper followed by accelerated
imports from the region. However, economic recessions led the
countries to export from their stocks that they had accumulated by
excessive utilisation of their capacities before the crisis (IMF, 1998).
Countries in the near future are expected to increase their production
to stimulate exports in a fairly competitive environment (Graph VI).
However, in the mean time, the situation is weaker exports to Asia
and higher imports from the region.
Over utilisation of the capacity in the pre-crisis period resulted in
an accumulation of stocks in the Southeast Asian countries so that
countries in the region could be able to export at low prices in
advance (IMF, 1998). The same trend should continue in the
following years even if the economies are contracting (which is
already a matter of debate). One particular reason for this fact is that
by further fiscal adjustment, domestic demand would be squeezed
and the production must be forwarded to the export markets in an
already accrued competitiveness by subsequent depreciations in their
currencies. For 1998, it is expected to be a worsening of the budget
balances in almost all emerging markets. However, this is aimed to
end in 1999 due to advice of the IMF on fiscal adjustment. Especially13
in the Southeast Asian countries, an improvement in the current
account positions is expected primarily due to the decline in imports.
Because competitive devaluations were not made in Latin American
countries to protect their export markets, an improvement in their
current accounts is not a consequence in the mean time. On the other
hand, Venezuela and Russia had different deterministic patterns. The
decline in the commodity prices resulted in the worsening of their
current account balances. This was particularly because their exports
were highly dependent on primary goods. In this respect, a significant
contraction in the Southeast Asian countries is expected to occur,
except in China in 1998. The same pattern is observed in Venezuela
and Russia. However, Latin American countries  are expected to face
a decline in the growth rates "not" a contraction  in 1998 (Table III).
5. The Effects of the Crisis on the G7 Countries
In order to cover their lost stock market wealth in the developed
markets which was due to subsequent falls during the crisis,
international investors realised their profits immediately in the
emerging markets. In addition, immediate falls and rises in the
stock markets resulted in increased volatility that created uncertainty
(Graph VII). In this respect, households long term investment  was
negatively affected from the increased volatility. This eventually
reduced the stock market wealth which was then expected to result in
a decreased household spending.
Moreover, funds that had been withdrawn from the emerging
markets due to uncertainty directed to the developed markets caused
increased demand especially for long term bonds. This eventually
resulted in a decrease of the bond yields. The fall in the yields was
initially reflected in the United States due to high capital repatriation to
the country. For convenience and representation of the basic14
locations in the world the United States, Germany and Japan are
investigated for comparison (Graph VIII).
With the emergence of the crisis, Japan, which had (even has)
a higher economic relationship with the region than any other country
in the world, began to live the results of the systemic financial
difficulties in her economy which began in the early 1990s. Major
institutions in the Japanese economy such as Yamaichi defaulted (a
similar one is observed in Peregrine which is located in Hong Kong)
due to a loss of capital in the region. Also, the yields are still lower in
Japan than other G7 countries. In this respect, international investors
became reluctant to invest in Japan. On the other hand, the capital
inflow to Germany did not increase because of the uncertainty
created with the losses of major German investment banks in the
Southeast Asian region and the process of integration of the
European countries under monetary union beginning on January 1,
1999.
In this respect, the United States turned out to be the best place
for the investor, because of the US dollar's dominance in the world
economy and strong economic performance of the country in 1997
and 1998 (Table IV), in the environment of decreasing inflation,
growing economy, higher yields than Germany and Japan and
comparably lower exposure of the US investment banks in Southeast
Asian region than other countries.
As a result, interest rate differentials among developed
countries increased volatility in the foreign exchange markets
(assuming that uncovered interest rate parity holds). The
strengthening of the United States economy in 1997 which has been
carried to 1998 appreciated the US dollar accordingly. In this respect,
the US dollar gained from 120's against the Japanese yen and 1.60's15
against the German mark in Autumn 1997 to high 140's and 1.80's in
the summer of 1998, respectively. However, The Fed's intervention in
the Yen/$ market in June by 5 billion US dollars of yen purchase was
the first impact for the reversal of the trend (Graph IX). Later capital
inflow began to the developed markets where they were considered
to be  safer places to go. However, the increased bond demand in
these markets increased the bond prices and lowered their yields.
As a result, three points should be considered. The first one is
increasing current account deficits resulted from increasing imports
from emerging markets (as the currency of the countries in the region
depreciates against advanced countries' currencies, the imported
goods from the region become cheaper that increase the total imports
from the region. GDP=C+I+G+(X-M), and subsequently decrease in
net exports decrease GDP) (IMF, 1998) (Graph VI). The second point
is that due to financial market losses, the net wealth of the
households decreased dramatically which, in turn, expected to
decrease the household spending. And last is financial distress
caused credit rationing which also rationed the investment through
credit channels. (Dornbusch, 1998)
Due to above mentioned reasons, industrial production in the
G7 countries presented a similar pattern of decline (Table IV, Graph
X),  and a recession in the world economy is expected in 1998 and
1999.
6. The Effects of the Crisis on Turkey
In the first half of 1998, policy goals of both the Treasury and
the Central Bank (reserve money target) were obtained within the
given limits which provided confidence in the markets for lowering
inflation in the near future (Graph XI). A number of factors has16
continued to influence the slowdown in the rate of inflation, namely
tighter fiscal policy (aiming at a primary surplus), low oil prices and
cautious liquidity and exchange rate management by the Central
Bank (does not necessarily mean tighter monetary policy since the
interest quotation margins widened and the lower bound was lowered
in order not to heavily squeeze liquidity in the money markets).
Another point is that the decreasing trend in the world commodity
prices (oil, aluminium, steel and iron, which are the main ingredients
of the public investment) helped the public sector not to inflate (not a
partial freeze in the public sector goods prices). These all gave a fall
in inflationary expectations that was initially reflected in the nominal
interest rates (Graph  XII). This trend continued until the end of July.
Nonetheless, as Russia and Latin America approached to a new eve
of a crisis, reversal of the downward trend occurred.
The aim of the Central Bank of Turkey in the first quarter of
1998 was to inject more stability to the financial markets which was
similar to the attempts since the eve of the crisis in the fourth quarter
of 1997. Achieved stability triggered the capital inflows in April and
May. The Central Bank had to sterilise the liquidity in order to stay
within the objectives of the monetary program. In this respect, net
foreign assets increased due to foreign exchange purchases and with
the help of open market operations, the injected Turkish lira was
offset so that net domestic assets decreased accordingly.
In May, the Central Bank stopped its operations in the Ýstanbul
Stock Exchange (ISE) and stopped compulsory foreign exchange
purchases in order to signal the market that the Central Bank would
be reluctant to sterilisation.
With the Staff Monitored Program, the Central Bank announced
a new monetary program in July which was aiming at targeting a new17
monetary aggregate on the Central Bank's balance sheet that was
the net domestic assets. The interest rate margin between the lower
and upper quotations was extended and with open market operations
the Central Bank did not heavily sterilise the Turkish Lira in order to
leave the market with liquidity and to increase volatility in the interest
rates. In this case, the Central Bank expected that markets determine
an equilibrium interest rate that avoids the need of sterilisation.  A
level of minus 1514 trillion Turkish liras for the end of 1998 was
announced for the net domestic assets (Table V). However, the
monetary program has been negatively affected by the economic
crisis in Russia which resulted in a capital flight from Turkey.
The Central Bank actively intervened in the foreign exchange
markets in order to provide exchange rate stability and to overcome
the excess liquidity demand in the money markets in August 1998
(Graph XIII). The Central Bank official foreign exchange reserves
declined by 4.2 billion US dollars. Also, the Central Bank held open
market operations (OMO) in order to reduce the uncertainty and
illiquidity in financial markets. Therefore, in August 1998, the Central
Bank  became a net lender to the market whereas it was in net debtor
position by the end of June (Net domestic Assets became positive).
As a result of these developments, the Central Bank monetary
program has deviated from its targets (net domestic asset target has
revised to 700 trillion Turkish liras as of the end of 1998). Since mid-
August the main policy aim of the Central Bank has been to sustain
exchange rate stability and to reduce negative effects of the
expectations to the Turkish economy, which we call to keep financial
market stability as the primary goal. However, the inflation outcome is
still in-line with the end-year projections.18
In parallel to the crisis in the Southeast Asia and Russia,
official international reserves of the Central Bank of Turkey
began to fall in October 1997, recovered in second quarter of 1998,
and then fell again in August 1998.
The loss of confidence in the emerging markets due to the
Southeast Asian crisis resulted in an increasing demand for foreign
exchange where the reserves of the Central Bank fell by 2.8  billion
US dollars in the last quarter of 1997, but since the Central Bank was
aiming to achieve financial market stability and not to stress the
exchange rate, the effect of the crisis was not as significant as the
Russian crisis in August 1998.
As mentioned before, the achieved stability through monetary
policy in the first quarter of 1998 provided the necessary confidence
to the markets. Several other measures were taken to keep in line
with the monetary program and sustain the financial markets stability.
In this respect, initially the compulsory foreign exchange purchases of
the Central Bank were postponed to slowdown the short-term capital
inflows. The second measure was to shift from daily repo operations
to weekly repo operations. This led the banking system to follow
weekly management of their holdings and to provide relief to the
banks that the Central Bank was willing to fund the markets at a
constant rate one week later.
The former measure led to an increase in the Central Bank
reserves until mid-August to 26.7 billion US dollars. However, with the
emergence of the Russian crisis capital flight had begun like in the
case of other emerging markets. In accordance with the
developments, the Central Bank sold approximately 5.2 billion US
dollars and reserves fell from 26.7 billion US dollars to 21.5 billion US
dollars (Graph XIV). Some parts of the foreign exchange purchases19
were immediately reflected as banks' closing their open positions
(Graph XV); however, a significant part was reflected as capital
outflow. This can be inferred from the bond holdings of the foreign
banks, an immediate fall in the bond holdings, which was parallel to
the fall in the Central Bank reserves, is observed (Graph XVI).
In August 1998, with the help of the crisis in Russia, capital
outflow resulted in a liquidity squeeze and a rise in the interest rates.
Two particular reasons contributed to the rise; one is the uncertainty
due to the unexpected reform measures announced on the tax
system and the use of public banks in providing agricultural support
funds which created an excess liquidity demand by the public banks.
The rise in the interest rates is observed on overnight, treasury
auctions, secondary market and 3 month time deposit rates (Graphs
XVII, XVIII). The rise in the interest rates also increased the volatility
and the level of interest rates. Another point to note is that the
overnight repo simple rates at the ISE began to increase up to 100
percent, which was then expected to result in an increase in the bond
market rates. The increase in the interest rates of the bond markets
would be reflected in the increasing cost of borrowing of the Treasury
and increase in the budget deficit, etc. In this respect, in order to
overcome the increase in the repo rates at the ISE, the Central Bank
again entered into the secondary market of the ISE by asking
quotations to fund the market to decrease the volatility. However, the
volume  of liquidity injection increased to the 400 trillion Turkish lira
level which was a sign of increasing liquidity demand. In the end,
beginning from August 28, 1998, the Central Bank shifted to auctions
in open market operations. There has been an increase in the level
and the volatility in the short-term interest rate when compared with
its pre-crisis level since then.20
Definitely, the crisis affected the Treasury's debt program and
cost of debt financing (Treasury bill rates) and "Maturity" of the debt.
The crisis as felt in the other emerging markets was reflected as a
capital outflow from the country which increased the liquidity demand
in the markets. This excess liquidity demand in the markets which
was reflected as an increase in the nominal interest rates (Graph XII),
especially in October and November, unfortunately increased the real
interest rates since inflation stayed way under the nominal interest
rates.
The increase in the interest rates was immediately reflected in
the Treasury's debt program. Initially, in one of the four auctions, the
actual amount of borrowing deviated from the expected quantity and
in the other from the expected maturity in August. The Treasury was
not able to suffice the amount of the borrowing for repayment of the
government debt. In September, another deviation in the quantity,
that was expected to be sold from a CPI indexed bond auction, was
observed.
One of the consequences of increasing interest rates was the
increasing cost of borrowing by the Treasury which deteriorates the
government's future budget balance. Another consequence of the
crisis was the shortening maturity of the debt, this particularly arises
from the increasing uncertainty in the market, where market became
even more reluctant to lend the government. In this respect, as of
September, the "average maturity" of the domestic short-term debt
shortened to 10.7 months from 12.4 months according to the figures
of the end of 1997 on cash based bonds and the "date to maturity"
became 6 months from 7.7 month levels in the end of 1997. The
average maturity of the short-term debt was realised as 6.1 months
as of September (Research Department, 1998).21
Other developments in Turkey also contributed to the
uncertainty in the markets such as the debate on the tax reform. The
content of the tax reform came out to be different from what the
market had already expected. Withholding tax began to be imposed
on the interbank deposits, repos and on all bonds and bills in all
maturities. Another aspect was bonds that have maturity over than a
year will be free of tax, however, this again did not come out. This
obviously created uncertainty and disapproval in the markets since
they believe that government would take further steps on the
misjudged points of the reform. On the other hand, the tax that was
expected to be imposed on the financial markets created extra
uncertainty on the present value of the expected future value of the
assets. This, in turn, accumulated the negative effects of the crisis. In
the end, by mid-September the government had to back on some
degrees of dispute such as lowering taxes on banking transactions
and insurance activities and cancelling withholding taxes on
government domestic debt instruments as of October 1998.
A second point to note is the lowering of the tax brackets of the
wage earners gradually first by 5 percent in August 1998 and another
5 percent  in the beginning of 1999.  In this respect, the lowest tax
bracket will begin from 15 percent. This puts extra pressure on the
budget and the Treasury's debt program since a lower revenue that
should be accrued in the first months of 1999 will definitely have to be
financed through Treasury's borrowing.
With the new measures taken to be applied in 1998, the tax
base increased by tax identity numbering, imposing taxes on
government domestic debt instruments and on revenues from rental
housing and inflation netted time deposits income. Also, the
announcement effect where people were informed about the tax22
system and the new developments had positive effect on the tax
collection. Following the measures, the budget deficit target which
has been expected to be 8.1 percent is expected to undershoot to 7.1
percent and the primary surplus target which has been aimed at 3.8
percent is expected to overshoot to 4.6 percent as of the end of 1998.
However, due to the crisis as discussed briefly in the previous
sections, government had to back on some issues of taxing on
financial instruments (as of October 1, 1998) that limited further fiscal
improvements in the last 3 months of the year.
As happened in other parts of the world, the ISE also presented
a downward trend during and after the crisis periods. Due to the
uncertainty about the near future and existing capital outflow, the ISE
composite index (CI) entered into a declining trend. However, even
worse happened after the fall of Russia.
In October 1997, due to Southeast Asian economic stress, in
February 1998 due to the Gulf crisis and in August 1998 due to the
Russian economic breakdown, the ISE immediately felt the effects
(Graph XIX). However, the loss of confidence with the Russian
default was the most effective on the market where a significant
amount of capital outflow did occur in the ISE (Graph XX).
In this respect, the ISE lost 40 percent in value since the
beginning of the year in Turkish lira terms and 56.5 percent in value in
US dollar terms which significantly accelerated after August 1998.
Also, total amount of capital outflow that began in late May to
September was 688 million US dollars.
The financial sector immediately responded to the volatility due
to the crisis, however, real sector followed a longer pattern. In terms
of the competitiveness measures, real effective exchange rate which23
is calculated by domestic private manufacturing prices does not
present a significant change since last October, according to the 1987
prices. From year on year, only 1 percent real depreciation was
observed until October. When we examine it from the beginning of
1998, a 0.7 percent real depreciation was seen.  This results from the
co-movement of the prices of the domestic private manufacturing
industry (the inputs of the industry is highly sensitive to the import
prices since the industry should consider the costs to meet the
demand) and the nominal effective exchange rate (Graph XXI).
When the terms of trade measures examined, there cannot be
seen any significant disadvantageous situation against Turkey (Graph
XXII). However, due to an approaching world recession, the volume
of trade began to decline as in the case of the world economy. It is
observed that a downward trend was observed in the export and
import figures. This is particularly due to the decline in the growth rate
of domestic demand and pessimist behaviour of the domestic industry
on production (Graphs XXIII, XXIV). One important factor affecting
the Turkish exports (mostly through shuttle trade) was the decreasing
exports to Russia, which is the second (before the crisis; the fourth
after the crisis) largest trading partner of Turkey. The contraction of
domestic demand in Russia contracted their imports from Turkey
immediately. However, due to a high percentage of goods exported
are consumption goods, Turkish exports (mostly in terms of shuttle
trade) are expected to increase in the near future. This rises from the
fact that consumption goods exported by Turkey is cheaper than
China and Italy, which are the main competitors of Turkey in the
shuttle trade to Russia (Mustafaoðlu, Burhan, 1998). On the other
hand, current account deficit is expected to be around 1.7 percent of
GDP by the end of 1998.24
In a recessing world with declining capital flows and volume of
trade, it is inevitable for the Turkish economy to sustain a high level of
growth. However, since the economic fundamentals are stable in the
Turkish economy, it is expected that economy should grow at a pace
of 4 percent which is less than the 10 year average. Declining trend is
also observed on the reference figures (Graph XXV).
7. Solutions to the Problem
The IMF's advice to countries in distress was to impose
excessive contraction in the monetary and fiscal policies to depress
the domestic demand and to generate future current account
surpluses to roll-over their foreign debt. In this respect, the IMF
technical assistance and financial aid programs were forwarded to the
crisis countries. The quotas of the Fund were increased and with the
leadership of the IMF, the G7 countries decided on financial
assistance to the countries that were having financial difficulties. The
loan programs of the IMF had been provided since the evolve of the
crisis to Southeast Asian countries reaching 100 billion US dollars. In
addition, recently, Latin America, especially Brazil is having a 30
billion US dollar loan from the G7 countries for financial sector
renovation. An increase in the amount of loans to 90 billion US dollars
to Latin America is also on the agenda. However, up to now, this only
seems to prevent the short-term outflows.
On the other hand, attempts to strengthening financial
markets through closer banking supervision and inspection began to
be discussed in the international arena. By closer inspection and
supervision in the banking system, the regulatory authorities can
easily prevent the markets from taking high risks, in this case
transparency on the accounts takes an important role so that risks in25
the system can easily be understood and solutions to the problem
can be easily be offered.
Another solution offered is the capital controls and fixed
exchange rate regime (!). Globalisation and financial deregulation in
the world resulted in the increased vulnerability of the world markets
(Dornbusch, 1998). A possible stress in one part of the world is
immediately reflected on other parts. Consequently, capital outflow in
the crisis economies would result in growth losses in the medium
term; emerging economies need external credit to pursue a long term
growth and to stay competitive in the world economy. If this credit
could not be found,  the world would be in stress. Consequently,
capital controls seems not to be a solution to the problem.
Moreover, as long as there is capital inflow, there will be
financial market stability and fixed exchange rate regime can be
pursued; however, one of the reasons of the crisis was the efforts to
keep the fixed exchange rate regime. This prevents currency risk for
the foreign investor where a safe environment is created through the
regime; however, in case of a fixing of the currency monetary
authority looses her freedom in conducting the monetary policy.
Hence, at every pre-crisis and crisis periods monetary authority must
intervene in the markets to keep the exchange rate stability still. This
again fails as a solution to the problem.26
8. Expectations about the Turkish Economy and Policies
that should be Pursued by the Agents
Economic situation in 1999 will mainly be determined by the
Treasury's debt program and the elections that are expected to be
held in April. Elections in April still continue to create uncertainty in
the expectations about the economy. In a time of serious economic
distresses, uncertainties about the government still create problems.
On the other hand, the Treasury has to roll over 22.2 to 25.2
billion US dollars of domestic and external debt plus the fiscal deficit
in the first 3 to 4 months of 1999, which will probably create an
upward pressure on the interest rates and it is a pretty high stock of
debt as compared to the 1998 figures, unless foreign debt will be
found. However, the Treasury is aiming at increasing the foreign
borrowing with the company of Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank
(600 million Deutsche Mark of foreign borrowing, which is definitely
low in amount but aimed at signalling the market for further capital
inflow to the country).
The recession expectations in the world is also expected to be
reflected in Turkey. There is not a way out since it is not possible for
Turkey to increase her growth when the world is going into
recession. The long-run potential growth of Turkey as calculated in
the last 20 years is 4.6 percent. The contraction in demand and
expected rise in the interest rates in the following year is expected to
result in an output loss in 1999 so that growth rate of the economy is
expected to be less than her potential rate in the following year.
However, the fundamentals such as current account deficit, budget,
etc. are still OK.27
However, Turkey should stay competitive where a slight
appreciation of the Turkish Lira is unbearable for the Turkish
economy in a competitive international market. The volume of trade of
Turkey is contracting due to slowing world economy. In this respect,
there will be no shift in the structural policies since fundamental
economic indicators are strong, if there is, it will be only gradual.
On the Central Bank side, we are aware of the fact that there is
no need for sharp depreciation, one cause is Turkey's foreign debt
stock will increase immediately in terms of the Turkish Lira as
happened in the case of Asian economies. Also, the Central Bank will
not appreciate the currency to be in-line with the competitiveness
concerns. On the other hand, capital outflow will be responded by
immediate interest rate rises as was done before and the Central
Bank will not finance the increase in the budget expenditures due to
elections that is planned to be held in April 1999.
9. Discussions for Further Adjustment in the World
Domestic demand led growth has become an initial concern
than any other instability to overcome a crisis. In this respect, inflation
should be taken as the second best policy concern by the policy
maker.
One policy for debate is the IMF based programs aiming at
depreciation and fiscal contraction which was implemented by
almost all countries. As noted earlier, the IMF based stabilisation
programs to the crisis countries begin with depreciation and continue
with further fiscal adjustment. The main concern of the Southeast
Asian countries and the IMF before crisis was to live low inflation
through fiscal surpluses. However, in this case depreciations faced by
the countries, initially lowers the prices of the exported goods but not28
the wages of the labourer. The labourers nominal wage does not
change however real wage declines. In this respect, the depreciations
can be considered as a transfer of wealth from the deprecating
economies to the developed economies since lower import prices
mean higher real income for the importing economies. This resulted
in a compression of inflationary expectations and realisations in the
developed economies.
On the other hand, fiscal surpluses obtained by increasing
taxes depress the growth of the economies. One important factor for
overcoming the crisis is to achieve current account surpluses through
contraction in demand and finance the foreign debt by expected
future current account surpluses. In this case, higher taxes are
imposed to squeeze demand and extract revenues to come up with
increased fiscal surplus that is definitely a further wealth transfer from
the emerging to developed economies.
An important point to note is the bail-out of major
corporations. One way to bail-out of the institutions is to transfer
funds to these institutions. In an economy lacking funds, foreign aid is
needed for restorations and  this happens by purchases of the
corporations shares in the already beared stock markets. A safe bet
is forecasting the crisis, exitting the bullish market by realising high
gains and purchasing in the bearing market at half price (!).
Eventually, decreasing yields in the developed markets in the
medium to long term are reflected on the lending rates of the banks
which, in turn, means higher investment trend in the future. So that
especially in the United States, the decrease in the yields will be
reflected in higher investment and growth that overcomes the
negative effects of the crisis through current account and the
depressed domestic demand in the country.29
10. Main Conclusions
Advancements in information technology and financial
innovations are still far away to avoid "illusions" in pricing the financial
instruments. We may even claim that recent moves on the low and
past moves on the high side of  "illusions" are supported by the
"sophistication" in the financial markets.
Decreasing "liquidity premium" due to globalisation and massive
liberalization of the capital account around the world reshaped the
investors behaviour with a bias towards short-term instruments.
However, the pricing of long-term instruments is affected more on the
availability of funds and short-term borrowing rates than the
fundamentals.
The worst of the crisis is not over yet. Problems in Latin
America would not have quick solutions like funding, those already
made avoided capital flight. Application of the "New Order" to
economics seems to be more difficult than dominating in military
power. Path of the adjustment still has the risks of domestic tensions,
which may require more funding.
There still remains a problem in Latin America, especially in
Brazil and Argentina where there is a possibility of a default in
Argentina due to a possible speculative depreciation in Brazil since
Argentina follows a "currency board" policy to stabilise the economy.
Is crisis that we are living through a "zero-sum" game or does
the crisis push the "global production frontier" down? For the time
being, we are more on the "zero-sum" side. Now, what can be said
about the identification of winners and loosers?
For the winners, capital inflows increased, interest rates
decreased more or less a flat yield curve, new refinancing decreased,30
feasibility in investment, problem of maturity mismatch of the
domestic intermediation in medium-term. For the loosers, is Africa
expanding? Domestic currency depreciates in order to keep the
individual competitiveness intact and fiscal contraction which
squeezes domestic demand in the medium term and discrepancy in
technological levels increase. How resilient are the emerging markets
to the changes?
It is likely that the G7 countries benefited from the crisis.
However, the United States even received more than the others. This
rises from the fact that increased bond demand decreased the
interest rates in the country, which was in line with the expected
expansion in the economy in the medium term. On the other hand,
the decreasing import prices increased the volume of imports,
subsequently the current account deficit in the rest of the world (other
than crisis countries) in the short-term, however, declines in the
prices first of all decreased the costs in the production line, which is
reflected as an increase in the real income of the importing country
and second helped the countries to pursue their long-term low
inflation targets.
Turkey has its own fundamentals, however, due to simplistic
categorisation, she is included in the same class with Russia and
some other emerging markets. In this respect, there still remains a
small percentage of possible gap for economic stress, if Russia
cannot take over. The Treasury's debt program in the first months of
1999 and elections in April mainly will determine the agenda.
However, an access to foreign borrowing will bring immediate relief in
the economy. The Central Bank is calm in her decisions, hence no
problem is expected on the monetary policy side unless any negative
externality occurs.31
A contraction in 1998 is expected in the world economy due to
contraction in the Southeast Asian countries. However, as far as the
measures taken in 1998, it is obvious that short-term outflow in the
emerging economies stopped and necessary economic recovery will
be present in 1999 in the whole world.32
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TABLE II





Sep_97 5.9 6.0 -1.9 6.5 5.0 8.6 14.5 11.2
Oct-97 -3.7 -9.7 -8.0 -29.4 -15.3 -11.4 -12.7 -23.8
Nov-97 4.5 5.8 1.1 -0.9 -22.2 -6.3 7.0 4.5
Dec-97 2.0 6.3 -8.3 1.9 20.8 -0.6 5.1 8.5
Jan-98 -0.1 5.2 9.0 -13.7 -28.4 -15.3 -12.6 -4.7
Feb-98 5.4 5.7 1.2 24.1 8.9 -2.1 4.7 8.7
Mar-98 4.3 8.6 -1.8 0.3 5.1 7.1 4.8 13.0
Apr-98 1.0 2.8 -5.4 -9.9 -4.0 -20.6 1.6 -2.3
May-98 -2.3 6.0 0.2 -14.0 -38.8 1.2 -11.2 -15.7
Jun-98 1.9 5.1 1.0 -4.4 -20.9 -22.3 -5.5 -1.7
Jul-98 -3.2 0.3 3.5 -7.1 -1.1 0.9 -0.9 10.6
Aug-98 -12.7 -17.9 -13.9 -8.3 -56.2 -40.1 -29.5 -39.6
Sep-98 3.2 -7.9 -5.0 8.4 -33.2 34.1 19.3 1.9
Oct-98 8.7 3.6 1.2 28.8 31.3 -6.7 14.1 6.9
Source: Bloomberg
Stock Market Indeces (percentage change)
TABLE I
End of Russia* Korea Thailand Argentina Brazil* Singapore Venezuela* Mexico Taiwan
period
1997 Jan 15.3 31.7 38.2 17.8 57.2 77.3 ...   20.3 89
Feb 14.0 30.5 37.2 19.0 57.9 77.2 15.8 21.3 89
Mar 15.2 29.9 37.1 17.7 57.5 78.7 16.0 21.1 90
Apr 16.5 30.7 36.3 17.5 54.3 79.0 15.9 22.6 90
May 18.2 32.7 32.3 19.3 57.7 80.4 16.1 24.5 91
Jun 20.0 34.1 31.4 19.9 56.0 80.7 16.7 23.8 91
Jul 24.5 33.4 29.4 19.8 59.0 79.4 16.5 24.6 89
Aug 24.5 31.1 24.9 20.0 61.8 76.8 18.6 25.8 88
Sep 23.9 30.4 28.6 19.5 60.7 77.3 18.3 27.0 86
Oct 23.1 30.5 30.3 19.8 52.4 74.5 18.3 28.1 84
Nov 22.9 24.4 25.3 20.0 50.7 74.4 18.9 27.0 84
Dec 16.8 20.4 26.2 22.3 52.2 71.3 17.8 28.8 84
1998 Jan 17.8 23.5 25.9 21.1 53.1 68.2 17.1 29.2 85
Feb 15.4 26.7 25.4 21.5 58.8 73.9 17.0 29.0 85
Mar 15.0 29.7 26.9 21.1 68.6 74.6 15.8 30.1 ...  
Apr 16.9 35.5 28.7 21.3 74.7 76.1 14.8 31.1 ...  
May 16.0 38.7 26.7 22.4 72.8 71.9 16.0 31.0 ...  
Jun 14.6 40.8 25.8 22.8 70.9 70.9 15.5 30.6 ...  
Jul 16.2 43.0 26.0 22.5 70.2 69.2 14.4 31.7 ...  
Aug 18.4 45.0 25.9 24.4 67.3 68.3 13.9 29.8 ...  
Sep  12.5 46.9 26.6 24.0 45.8 72.4 13.0 29.3 ...  
Oct 12.7 48.8 ...   ...   ...   ...   14.5 ...   ...  
Source: International Financial Statistics-IFS, excl. Russia
1/ minus Gold 



















1997 Jan 3 0.6 1.8 2.8 5.2 8.1 1.8 2.2 5.4 3.3 11.3 6.5
Feb 3 0.6 1.7 2.8 4.7 3.5 6.3 1.6 5.3 3.3 11.3 6.2
Mar 2.8 0.5 1.5 2.6 5.4 7.5 4 0.4 5.2 3.2 11.2 6.1
Apr 2.5 2 1.4 2.4 4.8 4.8 2.9 2.4 4.9 3.3 11.2 5.9
May 2.2 2 1.6 2.6 4.2 7.5 0.5 -0.1 4.8 3.5 11.4 5.8
Jun 2.3 2.2 1.7 3 3.8 7.8 2.8 2.4 5 3.5 11.4 5.7
Jul 2.2 2 1.9 3.4 4.7 5 5.9 2.2 4.8 3.4 11.5 5.5
Aug 2.2 2.1 2.1 3.5 4.9 3.3 1.1 2.2 4.9 3.4 11.6 5.3
Sep 2.2 2.4 1.9 3.6 5 4.3 0.9 1.4 4.9 3.4 11.7 5.2
Oct 2.1 2.4 1.8 3.8 5.6 2.1 4.3 1.4 4.7 3.5 11.8 5.2
Nov 1.8 2.1 1.9 3.7 5.7 -1.1 3.4 0.5 4.6 3.5 11.8 5.1
Dec 1.7 1.9 1.8 3.7 5.8 -1.3 3 0.1 4.7 3.4 11.9 5
1998 Jan 1.6 1.9 1.3 3.3 5.4 -3.2 7.8 -0.1 4.7 3.5 11.6 5
Feb 1.4 2 1.1 3.4 4.4 -3.1 4.9 -0.1 4.6 3.6 11.5 6.4
Mar 1.3 2.2 1.1 3.5 4.5 -5.2 4.5 1.1 4.7 3.9 11.5 6.4
Apr 1.5 0.4 1.4 4 4.3 -1.9 2.9 1.4 4.3 4.1 11.4 6.4
May 1.7 0.5 1.3 4.2 4.5 ...   5.4 1.0 4.3 4.1 11.2 6.3
Jun 1.7 0.1 1.2 3.8 3.3 ...   1.6 0.2 4.5 4.3 11 6.2
Jul 1.7 -0.2 0.9 3.4 2 ...   2.8 0.0 4.5 4.1 10.9 ...  
Aug 1.6 -0.4 0.8 3.3 3.1 ...   ...  
Source: International Financial Statistics-IMF ,  Economic Outlook - OECD




1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 Sep-98
Argentina 8.4 4.8 0.8 1.6 -3.3 -3.8 -2.1 -1.5 3.5 3.5 Ba3
Brazil 3.2 1.2 7.4 1.8 -4.2 -3.7 -6.1 -6.2 3.7 3.2 B2
Chile 7.1 4.8 6 4.8 -5 -7.1 1.4 0.5 2.2 3.1 Baa1
Mexico 7.1 4.8 16.3 15.8 -0.6 -3.3 -0.8 -1.4 5.7 6.1 Ba2
Venezuela 5.1 -0.1 38 34.7 7.7 -2.5 2.6 -5 1 1.4 B2
Russia 0.5 -5 10.9 139 1.2 -2.2 -8.4 -6.2 4.5 11.3 B3
China 8.7 6.6 2.8 -0.5 1.9 1.5 -0.7 -2 7.8 9.4 A3
Hong Kong 5.3 -4.1 5.7 3.2 -3.8 0.2 5.8 -2.3 4.2 4.5 A3
Indonesia 4.6 -23.7 7.1 63.5 -1.9 13.1 -0.2 -5 3.2 3.1 B3
Malaysia  7.8 -3.6 2.7 5.8 -4.8 8.2 1.8 -2.2 3.6 3.5 Baa3
The Philippines 5.2 -1.9 5.1 9 -5.2 0.4 0.1 -1 2.8 2.4 Ba1
South Korea 5.5 -9.6 4.4 7.6 -1.9 13.9 -0.5 -5 8.6 5.1 Ba1
Thailand -1 -6.9 6.5 8.7 -1.4 9.1 -0.9 -4 5.6 4.1 Ba1
Source: Paribas (1998) Emerging Markets Research", London
Bloomberg, Online database






(% of GDP) GDP (Annual %) CPI (Annual %)35
TABLE V
9712 9801 9802 9803 9804 9805 9806 9807 9808 9809 9810
ASSETS (1+2) 1,934.0 2,189.4 2,148.2 2,299.5 2,391.6 2,540.5 2,641.4 2,902.4 3,079.9 3,087.1 3,256.1
1. Net Foreign Assets (a+b) 1,791.0 2,157.9 2,204.2 2,797.5 3,619.8 4,039.6 4,419.5 4,194.1 3,296.9 2,992.3 2,882.5
     a. Foreign assets 4,337.0 4,874.6 5,054.7 5,786.0 6,786.3 7,313.5 7,770.2 7,684.6 6,862.6 6,775.8 6,839.8
     b. Foreign liabilities -2,546.0 -2,716.7 -2,850.5 -2,988.5 -3,166.5 -3,273.9 -3,350.6 -3,490.6 -3,565.8 -3,783.5 -3,957.3
2. Net Domestic Assets (a+b+c+d+e+f+g) 143.0 31.6 -56.0 -498.0 -1,228.2 -1,499.1 -1,778.1 -1,291.7 -216.9 94.9 373.6
     a. Net cash credits to public sector (aa+ab+ac) 6.0 148.0 101.5 -154.4 -404.8 -383.5 -223.4 -106.5 -101.8 6.0 147.8
        aa. Cash Credits to public sector 892.0 894.7 913.4 653.6 615.3 699.6 693.1 742.3 775.5 766.3 845.6
        ab. Deposits of public sector -182.0 -255.3 -174.2 -279.8 -108.6 -229.6 -260.8 -256.7 -365.5 -292.7 -185.2
        ac. FX Deposits of non-bank sector -704.0 -491.3 -637.8 -528.3 -911.6 -853.5 -655.6 -592.1 -511.8 -467.6 -512.6
     b. Extra budgetary funds -50.0 -44.8 -50.2 -51.2 -41.3 -26.5 -11.6 -17.2 -18.0 -16.5 -25.0
     c. Deposits of non-bank sector -7.0 -3.5 -4.5 -9.9 -9.0 -8.1 -10.7 -13.0 -13.5 -9.8 -11.7
     d. Cash Credits to banking sector 8.0 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.2 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.4
     e. Open market operations 720.0 571.4 589.0 197.1 -311.4 -583.3 -1,008.5 -569.5 626.9 871.7 1,101.5
     f. Other items -342.0 -378.2 -444.2 -478.9 -415.3 -394.1 -339.1 -363.5 -425.2 -468.8 -515.7
     g. Fx revaluation account -190.0 -269.0 -255.2 -8.3 -53.7 -111.2 -192.5 -229.6 -293.1 -295.5 -330.8
LIABILITIES 1,934.0 2,189.4 2,148.2 2,299.5 2,391.6 2,540.5 2,641.4 2,902.4 3,079.9 3,087.1 3,256.1
1. Reserve money (X) (a+b+c+d) 1,934.0 2,189.4 2,148.2 2,299.5 2,391.6 2,540.5 2,641.4 2,902.4 3,079.9 3,087.1 3,256.1
     a. Currency issued 759.0 947.7 810.5 897.9 924.7 928.2 1,006.0 1,177.1 1,239.3 1,195.3 1,280.8
     b. Required reserves of banking sector 336.0 364.0 376.7 387.0 416.0 470.6 526.3 572.7 586.0 598.3 651.2
     c. Free deposits of banking sector 34.0 29.1 31.9 46.2 38.9 81.7 20.4 38.0 83.2 65.6 51.8
     d. FX Deposits of banking sector 804.0 848.6 929.1 968.4 1,012.0 1,060.0 1,088.7 1,114.5 1,171.4 1,227.9 1,272.3
Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
CENTRAL BANK BALANCE SHEET
(Trillion TL)36
Source: Bloomberg online database
Source: Bloomberg online database
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Source: IMF (1998) "World Economic Outlook", IMF, Washington D.C.
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Source: Bloomberg online database
Source: IMF (1998) "World Economic Outlook", IMF, Washington D.C.
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Current Account Balances 
(billion US dollars) 39
Source: Bloomberg online database
Source: Bloomberg online database
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Spread (10 year TB - 3 month Libor)40
Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
Source: IMF (1998) "International Financial Statistics", IMF, Washington D.C.
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Industrial output of selected advanced economies (annual percentage change)41
Source: State Institute of Statistics "CPI and WPI Indices", available at http://www.die.gov.tr/
Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
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Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
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International Reserves (million  US dollars)43
Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey









































































































































































Open Positions (billion US dollars)44
Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
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Repo (all maturities, composite rates)
Bonds and Bills rates (composite)
GRAPH XVIII
Interest Rates (composite, nominal, percentage)45
Source:(1997-1998) Ýstanbul Stock Exchange "Weekly Bulletins", ISE, Ýstanbul












































































































































































































































































































































Ocak'97 Mart Mayýs Temmuz Eylül Kasým  Ocak'98 Mart Mayýs Temmuz Eylül
GRAPH XX
Net Foreign Investment in ISE (US dollars)46
Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
Source: State Institute of Statistics "Foreign Trade Indices" available at http://www.die.gov.tr/
TURKISH/SONIST/DISTICIND/251198.htm
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Source: State Institute of Statistics "Economic and Social Indicators" available at
http://www.dpt.gov.tr/dptweb/esg/esgx.html
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GRAPH XXV
Growth Rate of GNP 
(annual percentage change)